Terrorism, Radicalism and Weapon Smuggling

Can the Expansion of Russian Military Manufacturing be Criminalised? Warnings of the G7 Leaders’ Summit Through a Legal Lens 

Aneta Fraser

The terms ‘Mafia-States’ and ‘organized crime’ may prompt the need to refer to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, in which case the content of Article 5(1)(b) could be examined. This article states that a State Party should ‘criminalise in its legislation the act of organising, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the commission of a serious crime involving an organised criminal group’. Supplementing that with the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, one could notice that its scope encompasses illicit manufacturing, trafficking in firearms or their parts and components. Should this prove insufficient, it may be advisable to consider the Ghada Waly’s statement (International Review of the Red Cross, 2023) regarding the potential collusion between terrorist and organized criminal groups. In light of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, it would appear that particular actors’ support for Russian industrial base is worthy of further consideration in the context of the Article 2(3)(c) of that Convention, which states that committing an offence includes not only participating as an accomplice, but also a mere intentional contribution to the commission of one or more offences by a group of persons. Irrespective of the ratification status of the Palermo Protocol and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, it is evident that these solutions, designed to influence the adoption of national solutions, are inadequate in the face of organisations that are in collusion with the government. In these instances, the States are inclined to manipulate the implementation of the provisions in order to avoid criminalising certain behaviours. What interest does the State have in criminalising the actions of actors, whose interests coincide with those of the government? Well, it would seem that there is none. However, it is possible to identify a potential solution to this problem. This begins with the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, Article 2(3)(c).

Islamists’ radical ideology and criminality of prisoners in the United Kingdom

Dickson Ajisafe

One of the challenges confronting the UK prison system is the proliferation of radical ideological orientations, including Islamist radical ideology. Studies have revealed that radical Islamist orientation has influenced the behaviours of its recipients, including those who are behind bars. With reference to prisoners in the UK, this study critically examines the impacts of Islamist ideological orientation and its influence on criminal behaviours of inmates who embrace this ideology. The study takes a critical attempt to examine the contributory impacts of radical Islamist ideology and the criminality of inmates, exposing them to further criminal behaviours, whether while in custody or after their release. Drawing insights from extant literature as well as relevant case studies in the UK and other jurisdictions, this study raises questions such as; what is Islamist radical ideology and what influence does it have on prisoners in the UK? How has the UK government responded to Islamist radical ideology and what have been the outcomes so far? Finally, what points of action are required of the UK government in tackling Islamist radical ideology in its prisons?  

Trajectory of illicit SALW flow

Taiwo Lawrence Adeyemi

The influx of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) into Cameroon can be attributed to various factors, including porous borders with neighbouring countries, particularly Nigeria and the Central African Republic; weak border control and management; corruption and complicity among security forces; armed conflicts and instability in neighbouring countries, leading to the diversion of weapons into Cameroon; and demand from armed groups, criminal networks, and terrorist organizations operating in the region. The flow of illicit SALW into Cameroon is likely to follow existing smuggling routes and networks, exploiting vulnerabilities in border control and management. The 40-meter bridge at Mfum is a specific location that has been identified as a hotspot for arms smuggling across the border post. This bridge likely connects Cameroon to a neighbouring country, possibly Nigeria or the Central African Republic, and its proximity to the border post makes it an attractive route for arms traffickers. The fact that arms smuggling is occurring at this location suggests that there may be vulnerabilities in border control and security measures in place. It's possible that corrupt officials or lack of effective surveillance and monitoring are contributing factors.